LTE iPhone? Not until 2013, I reckon

There was a lot of speculation about whether Apple might have made some sort of announcement about 3.75G or 3.9G support in the iPhone. In the end, the iPhone 4 has stuck to the tried-and-tested HSPA formular, rather than going to HSPA+ or LTE.

This is pretty much unsurprising.

There was no technology pragmatism behind the assertions that, because Sprint was launching the so-called 4G Evo HTC phone, that Steve Jobs might try and one-up its rivals.

I guess there was a vague chance they could have put out an HSPA+ variant, which would have as much right to a 4G marketing slogan as current WiMAX (ie nil), but given the general thinness of HSPA+ availability today, it was also improbable.

Moreover, at the risk of making myself a hostage to fortune, I don't expect an LTE iPhone in 2011 either. At present, I'd rate the distribution of probabilities to be:

2011 - 5% chance
2012 - 30%
2013 - 45%
2014 - 15%
2015 or later - 5%

There are numerous reasons that I'm dismissive of the idea of a so-called 4G LTE iPhone:

• History - Apple has shown little interest in being first to market with a new radio technology, and would rather wait until there is a sizeable base of stable networks on which to launch. Hence the first iPhone only having EDGE. By 2011, only a few networks will have launched LTE, and none will have really decent coverage.
• Power consumption and optimisation - who honestly believes that the first batch of LTE chipsets and devices will be that great at power management, cell-to-cell handoff and all those other "hygiene factors" that make for a decent user experience?
  
• Frequency bands - as I've written before, the LTE world is going to be very fragmented. 700MHz in the US, 2100Hz and then 1700MHz in Japan, some mix of 800 / 900 /1800 / 2600MHz in Europe, TDD versions in China and so on. Trying to get a 4- or 5-band LTE device capable of roaming or even sale in multiple geographies is a long way off. Add in delays in even selling spectrum in 2.6GHz or 800MHz digital dividend, and some idea of harmonisation, let alone network deployment goes back further.
  
• Fallback to 3.5G - any LTE smartphone will need to have decent 3.5G backup, probably HSPA in the current bands. A Verizon LTE one would need CDMA EVDO (seems unlikely unless they get an exclusive to take over from AT&T). If Europe goes to 2.6GHz as the main LTE band (which is still unclear), then fallback to 3G indoors is going to be happening a lot of the time
• Operator fragmentation. Apart from a couple of markets like the US, Apple is now pursuing a multi-operator strategy. The likelihood that multiple operators *within* a country will end up with similar LTE/HSPA mix of bands is looking very improbable.
• Voice and SMS - 'nuff said.
• Indoor usage scenarios - ditto
• Price - adding in more expensive basebands, radio components, loads of testing, software integration.... all for what? A higher theoretical peak speed, under optimum conditions, which may not even be useable by the device?
  

Overall, I reckon Apple will care much more about *average* speeds attainable by users across a broad range of countries, operators and environments. It is far from clear that LTE will be the driving factor for improvements in "normal, average user experience" for several years, especially when averaged across multiple countries and operators.

There's no rush. I think Apple will wait until LTE works at least as well as HSPA does already.

Got your own opinion on when it will launch? Check out the vote set up for me by Live Talkback - http://m.livetalkback.com/disruptiveanalysis

NEW Mobile Broadband Traffic Management Paper

NEW Broadband Business Models Strategy Report

Read More

Thought for the day - mobile communities...

Question:

Of a given group of friends / associates, what is the probability that they will either:

a) Share the same mobile operator
b) Share the same mobile device / OS
c) Share the same Internet social network
d) Share the same interoperable multi-operator / multi-device client & service?

Read More

Upcoming events

I'm going to be at the following events over the next few weeks. Please let me know if you want an informal meeting or introduction, either as a potential clients of Disruptive Analysis, or as a quick analyst briefing.

8/9th June - IIR In-Building Summit, London (speaking about data traffic & impact on in-building coverage and capacity)

15/16th June - TEN Telecoms Executive Network, London (moderating panel on mobile broadband)

23/24 June - Avren Femtocell event & Femto Forum Awards Dinner, London

I can be reached via information AT disruptive-analysis DOT com

Read More

New Cisco VNI traffic report out

One of the broadband industry's "bibles" has been published in a 2010 edition.

Cisco's "Visual Networking Index" predictions of fixed and mobile data traffic are some of the most widely-cited charts and qualitative predictions in the industry.

I'll go through it with a fine-toothed comb when I get a chance, but one thing sticks out immediately:

2014 = 63.9 Exabytes / month total IP traffic
... of which 3.5 Exabytes / month is mobile data (ie 5.5%)

What is not clear to me at first sight is what happens to femtocell and WiFi offloaded traffic - ie is it double-counted? Especially femto traffic, which is likely to traverse two sets of routers first in the fixed ISP's network, and then again in the mobile operator's own core.

(I'm assuming that the figures exclude double-counting "private IP" traffic, such as transport between cell sites and RNCs and the operator core, where provided via a 3rd-party wholesale network operator)

NEW Mobile Broadband Traffic Management Paper

NEW Broadband Business Models Strategy Report

Read More

Optimised Internet apps. vs. RCS vs. multi-headed clients

OCT 11 2010 NEW REPORT AND BLOG POST ON RCS HERE
I'm currently digging into IMS/RCS for what may turn into an "epitaph" research paper. My current spoken and blogged views on it are well-known, but I feel it is worthy of a more weighty and analytical piece.

I'm currently sifting through assorted vendors' websites, GSMA RCS specs, YouTube video demos and so forth.

I'm struck by one very clear question:

On a half-decent phone, why would anyone want to use a multi-headed / aggregated app, hooked into various social networks and messaging services, rather than an optimised one from the underlying Internet service?

For example: The chance that an operator/RCS-mediated "Facebook experience" is ever going to be better than a native app or browser-based "Facebook experience" is surely zero, isn't it? Or am I missing something? Is the operator-based option solely for low-end devices that can't support proper apps?

Surely, the day a web-based service updates its capabilities with something cool and new (say, a "dislike" button, or innovative photo-upload feature), it can update both its browser and app-based interfaces. But it's stuck with whatever the current device client can support for the operator-mediated version.

I can perhaps see the value of importing some operator data and capabilities (eg presence, billing) inside the Facebook app - but I really struggle to see the rationale for doing things vice versa.

The way I see it, social networks become (relatively) more important through two main routes:
1) Viral adoption of standalone clients or web access because of some unique & desirable features to a specific user community
2) Piggybacking on another successful social network as a platform, and then spinning out to standalone once reaching critical mass

So... what is the "vector" for an operator-based social networking service to become widely adopted? Is there a catalyst for "virality"? Is the fundamental desire for that virality being embedded in RCS's design criteria and specifications? At the moment, I see it as being engineering-led, with little regard for basic behavioural psychology.

I'd contend that for innovative mobile applications to become successful, virality is more important than interoperability. (And then there's openness / extensibility, but that's a whole other story).

Read More

AT&T tiering, femtocells and holistic traffic management

AT&T has finally seen the light and recognised that "true unlimited" mobile data plans are unrealistic, moving instead to tiered offerings. Most of the rest of the world outside the US has long had tiered / capped services for both smartphones and laptop modems, so this starts to bring North America in line with practices elsewhere.

However, I'm not too convinced by the details. It's 200MB/month for $15, or 2GB/month for $25, plus additional overage charges of $15 for 200MB or $10 for 1GB on the respective plans.

The 200MB / 2GB looks too much like a cynical "Goldilocks" fee structure to me. Too Little, or Too Much. But not "Just Right". A good proportion of smartphone users have monthly usage in the general range 200-500MB - as indicated by AT&T's rather disingenuous comment that "currently, 65 percent of AT&T smartphone customers use less than 200 MB of data per month on average."

Let's think about that last statement. Firstly, we know that some smartphone users - notably corporate BlackBerry users - are relatively low-usage, and bring down the average. And they will be on separate BlackBerry / corporate plans anyway. Secondly, that means that if they use <200MB *on average* then it is likely that there will be variation about that average. In other words, a good proportion who are (say) hovering between 150-250MB/month will incur overage fees on a regular basis, assuming no "rollover" of unused allowances.

The other standout is the pricing of the packages is decidely non-linear. If the incremental cost of 1GB of data is given as $10, then that then points to a single-digit $ base cost per GB. So the overage charge on the 200MB package is clearly being made at an astonishing mark-up.

The clear message is that "normal" consumers are being pointed towards the $25 plan, with only exceptionally low-end smartphone users benefiting from the low-rate option.

The other detail missing from the press release is the apparent fact that femtocell traffic ("Microcell" in AT&T parlance) is *included* in counting towards the quota, but WiFi traffic is *excluded*.

[Hat-tip to competitor / peer Peter Jarich via Twitter for the Microcell anecdote. However, please note that I haven't been able to source this independently, so what follow may need to be edited if AT&T issues a contrary clarification]

This goes to the heart of some of themes in my recent research paper on Mobile Traffic Management, and the need for holistic thinking within operators. Given that the RAN generally costs much more than the core network for most operators, there should clearly be differential (or zero-rated) pricing for traffic using femtocell offload. Either that, or there should be a mechanism for customers to charge AT&T for using THE USER'S broadband pipes for backhaul.

It is critical that any policy management and charging infrastruture is capable of discerning bearer type (which could also be UMA WiFi tunneled via the core on some other networks). Otherwise it makes a total mockery of the concept that policy is intended to align pricing with the underlying costs of service delivery.

It also makes a mockery of the femtocell concept as a mass proposition, if the end-user has to pay more than using their own WiFi. If I was a femto vendor today, I'd be spitting feathers about this, as it completely undermines the positioning vs. WiFi as an offload tool.

I also know that many vendors claim it is feasible to distinguish between femto and macro traffic in their DPI / policy products because I've been asking this specific question to many of them the last month or so. And let's face it, it's pretty obvious if traffic is coming through the carrier's femto gateway - if the operator can be bothered to do the integration, and has a rating/charging system up to the job of differentiating it on the quota and bill.

My guess is that the RAN offload/femto project at AT&T has been disconnected from the tiering/policy initiative. This is not the first example of one isolated aspect of traffic management being disconnected from others. Nor will it likely be the last, given the proliferation of techniques and technologies being deployed. Many will have unfortunate side-effects and unintended consequences - as I discussed regarding video compression / optimisation recently.

It's possible that AT&T recognises the issue and will fix it in time - but at the very least it ought to recognise the issue explicitly.

If you want to know more about the range of mobile broadband traffic management options - and the need for a holistic approach to avoid outcomes like this, you need to read my recent research paper. Details are here, and it's priced from just $350.

Read More

Does a "coalition of the losers" ever win?

I'm currently looking at a number of mobile application domains, such as messaging, social networking, VoIP and application downloads.

One thing that strikes me is that we frequently see powerful incumbents being challenged by alliances. Apple faces attack from operator-run appstores. Facebook is viewed enviously by others that would like to control social networks. MSN has been pursued by various own-brand IM proponents. Visa and Amex are regularly targeted by new payment mechanisms.

But one regular characteristic of this type of competition in the mobile domain is the "coalition of the losers" approach, usually based on the notion of interoperability as a competitive differentiator. Industry bodies like the GSMA are frequently the drivers of such initiatives, although often they take over a pre-existing coalition.

We've seen failed attempts to build an IM interoperability community. My current view is that the RCS Initiative is also on its last legs (I'm currently writing an "epitaph" paper if anyone would like to try to change my mind). Now we have the Wholesale Application Community. There have been assorted others around payments, identity and mobile broadband (sorry, WiMAX Forum).

But I am struggling to think of a single case in which a losers' coalition has ended up being successful. For that matter, I'm not sure I can think of an example outside the telecoms industry either, where a single powerful Samson has been brought down by a coordinated horde of Davids.

Having 53 previously-ineffectual companies attacking a strong individual player usually just proves that 53 x Zero = Zero

Where change does occur, it's usually another proprietary or standalone player. BlackBerry's Messenger is taking bigger lumps out of MSN's user base than operators' messaging services ever have. It's Facebook that has given MySpace a kicking, not a consortium. Vodafone's M-Pesa has had more of an impact on mobile banking than any number of joint initiatives. Paypal has made the biggest impact on online payments.

In the airline industry, it has been the impact of individual low-cost carriers like Ryanair and Easyjet that have caused the greatest shake-ups, not Star Alliance or OneWorld.

One possible exception might be the Open Handset Alliance, aka Android. And more generally, the open-source model tends to fare a lot better than the "industry collaboration" approach at unseating incumbents.

I'm genuinely curious about this - if anyone has an example where a "coalition of the losers" has been triumphant in mobile, I'd love to know.

Read More